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Article III Adultification of Kids:
History, Mystery, and Troubling
Implications of Federal Youth
Transfers
Mae C. Quinn * and Grace R. McLaughlin **

Abstract
There is no federal juvenile court system in the United
States. Rather, teens can face charges in Article III courts and
can be transferred to be tried and sentenced as adults in these
venues. This Article is the first of two articles in the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice seeking to
shed light on the largely invisible processes and populations
involved in federal youth prosecution. This Article focuses on the
federal transfer and prosecution of American youth as adults. It
considers constitutional and statutory law relating to these
federal transfers and then considers why current practices are
incompatible with Kent v. United States and evolving standards
of decency doctrine. It also warns of other dangers relating to
prosecuting youth as adults in our federal criminal justice
system.

* ©2019, Mae C. Quinn, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Florida
Levin College of Law.
** ©2019, Grace McLaughlin, University of Florida Levin College of
Law, Class of 2021.
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I. Introduction
In the United States, juvenile law and justice have been
long considered state-level concerns. 1 What many people do not
1.
See PANEL ON JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT AND
CONTROL, JUVENILE CRIME JUVENILE JUSTICE 5–7, 155 (Joan McCord et al. eds.,
2001) (pointing out that there are fifty-one different juvenile justice systems
in the U.S. and suggesting that juvenile justice is largely under the purview
of the state).
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realize, however, is that existing federal law allows young
people under the age of eighteen to be prosecuted in U.S. district
courts, too. 2 Although there is no federal juvenile court system
with youth-specific features, teens in this country may face
charges in Article III courts for a wide range of reasons. 3
Beyond this, U.S. Attorneys have the power not only to
proceed with federal charges against children—but to transfer
them to be tried and sentenced as adults. 4 To date, little has
been written about these largely invisible processes and
populations. We seek to shed further light on the situation—
particularly under the Trump Administration—in two different
articles. This Article, published as part of Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice’s “Issues in Federal
Sentencing” Symposium, will focus on federal transfer of youth
and their prosecution as adults. 5 The second essay, to be
published in the days ahead by the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice, will examine the issue of
prosecution of kids as kids in Article III courts. 6
In Part I, this Article explains the constitutional standards
for adult prosecution and sentencing of youth as established by
the U.S. Supreme Court over several decades of juvenile justice
2.
See id. at 155 (“The federal government has jurisdiction over a small
number of juveniles, such as those who commit crimes on Indian reservations
or in national parks, and it has its own laws to govern juveniles within its
system.”).
3.
See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018).
4.
It should be noted at the outset that any juvenile case filed in federal
court is considered “certified” from the state system to the federal system. 18
U.S.C. § 5032. This should not be confused with the term “certification” as
used in some state systems to denote the process for trying to prosecute
children as adult defendants. In the federal court system, that process is
referred to as juvenile “transfer.” See id. (using the term “transfer” throughout
the statute). That is, a child’s case will be transferred in the Article III court
system when it moves from being treated as a juvenile delinquency case to an
adult criminal matter. Id. Thus, throughout this Article we generally use the
term “transfer” when talking about the process of deciding whether to
prosecute a child as an adult in the federal or state court system.
5.
By “we” here, I am referring to myself and my University of Florida
Law student co-authors. As noted above, Grace McLaughlin is my co-author
for this essay.
6.
University of Florida Law Student Levi Bradford is my co-author for
this forthcoming essay.
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jurisprudence. Part II discusses the development over time of
federal statutory law relating to the prosecution of children as
adults in federal courts. It examines current federal statutes
that allow juveniles to be tried as adults in the federal system,
including the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act. And it considers whether such provisions
comport with the letter and spirit of Supreme Court case law
creating constitutional rights for court-involved youth.
Part III then looks at some of the current realities of Article
III adultification of youth. It focuses on certain categories of
children, in part through case studies, to demonstrate the ways
in which current practices do not comport with Kent or modern
evolving standards of decency doctrine. It also warns of the
dangers of continued federal transfer strategies that traumatize
already vulnerable youth—potentially leading to tragedy even
before sentencing.
II. Supreme Court, Kent, and Kids Categorically Less
Culpable: A State-Focused Story
A. Kent and Basic Standards for Juvenile Transfer
Proceedings
Many lawyers and law students know about the 1967
landmark juvenile justice case of In re Gault. 7 In Gault, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the practices of juvenile courts—
specialized youth-focused venues that emerged all across the
country starting in 1899—to handle child prosecutions. 8 In
seeking to treat youth as different from adults, the Court
declared that many of these courts had moved too far in the
direction of informality. 9 Thus, it established a range of due
process requirements for juvenile court prosecutions—including

7.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 36, 55 (1967) (holding that a juvenile has
due process rights, including a right to notice of charges, counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and privilege against selfincrimination).
8.
Id. at 14–15.
9.
Id. at 26–27.
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the rights to notice, to counsel, against self-incrimination, and
to confront witnesses at trial. 10
However, in 1966, one year prior to Gault, the Supreme
Court decided another critically important case involving the
due process rights of juveniles, which is much less well known.
That case, Kent v. United States, 11 established basic standards
juveniles should be afforded before being transferred to adult
court to face criminal prosecution and sentencing. 12 Morris Kent
became involved with the juvenile court system in the District
of Columbia two years prior to his arrest for allegedly entering
a woman’s home, sexually assaulting her, and stealing her
wallet. 13 At the time of his second arrest, Kent was sixteen years
old and still on probation for crimes he committed at the age of
fourteen. 14 Upon interrogation, Kent told police officers that he
was involved in the new crimes. 15
The government sought to try Kent as an adult. 16 Thus,
Kent’s attorney filed several motions with the juvenile court,
including a motion requesting a hearing to challenge Kent’s
transfer. 17 To transfer Kent to adult criminal court, the juvenile
court judge had to follow the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act, which purportedly required a “full investigation”
prior to transfer. 18
Claiming it made the requisite “full investigation” into
Kent’s case, the trial court waived juvenile court jurisdiction
without formally considering defense counsel’s motions,
allowing Kent to have a hearing, or providing “any reason for
10.
See id. at 33, 36, 55 (articulating the particular rights extended to
accused youth).
11.
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966) (imposing due
process requirements for transferring youth from juvenile court to adult courts
to face criminal charges).
12.
Id. at 557.
13.
Id. at 543.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 544.
16.
See id. (outlining the arguments of the prosecution).
17.
See id. at 545–46 (detailing the actions of the defendant’s attorney
when in juvenile court).
18.
Id.
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the waiver.” 19 The court also took account of ex parte
information that Kent was not provided in ultimately deciding
Kent was beyond reach of juvenile court rehabilitation. 20
Subsequently, Kent was indicted and convicted as an
adult. 21 Thereafter, Kent was sentenced to a de facto term of life
imprisonment. 22 The Supreme Court took certiorari, concerned
that juveniles like Kent were being provided with less protection
than adults suspected of criminal offenses. 23 Furthermore, the
lack of process was in no way paternalistic on the part of the
government. 24 In the end, the Court determined there had been
“procedural error with respect to waiver of jurisdiction” 25 and
mandated basic procedural due process protections for youth
facing juvenile court transfer.
While the Court agreed the Juvenile Court Act properly
allowed for the juvenile court’s discretion when determining
whether or not to waive jurisdiction over a particular juvenile,
the Court also stated that “this latitude is not complete” and
that the statute “does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a
license for arbitrary procedure.” 26 The Court held that based on
“society’s special concern for children,” it would be inconceivable
that a juvenile facing transfer would receive such a “tremendous
consequence[] without ceremony.” 27 Furthermore, the Court
recognized that while a State may wish to view itself as “parens
patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge,” this
“‘parental’ relationship [was] not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness.” 28

19.

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 545–56 (1966).
Id. at 549.
21.
See id. at 548 (describing outcome of prosecution in criminal case).
22.
See id. at 550 (stating that the petitioner was further certified to a
mental institution as part of the disposition in his case).
23.
Id. at 551–52.
24.
See id. at 555 (describing possible protectionist approach under guise
of parens patriae doctrine).
25.
Id. at 552.
26.
Id. at 553.
27.
Id.
28.
Id. at 555.
20.
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The Court concluded that “as a condition to a valid waiver
order, petitioner [w]as entitled to a hearing, including access by
his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports
which presumably are considered by the court, and to a
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.” 29
Further, the Court held that at the time of juvenile court waiver,
the transferring judge must “set forth the basis for the order
with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.” 30
Kent further established that juvenile transfer or waiver
constitutes a critical stage in the juvenile’s court proceedings. 31
Therefore, the Court concluded, “[a]ppointment of counsel
without affording an opportunity for hearing on a ‘critically
important’ decision is tantamount to denial of counsel.” 32 While
it did not set forth the exact steps that must be followed in a
transfer proceeding, the Court explained “the hearing must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.” 33
To this end, the Court attached to the Kent decision an
“Appendix to [the] Opinion of the Court,” reflecting the policy in
place at the time of Kent’s waiver that was “promulgated by the
Judge of the Juvenile Court [in the District of Columbia].” 34
Although not incorporated into the holding of the opinion, “the
citation of the standards apparently represents the Court’s
sanction of the District of Columbia criteria of amenability to
treatment.” 35 And, indeed, many states have expressly adopted
these procedural requirements in their juvenile codes to be used
in connection with transfer hearings. 36
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 562.
See id. at 562 (citing Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 50

(1959)).
34.
Id. at 546 n.4.
35.
Michael Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Transfer
Procedure: The Ten Years since Kent v. United States, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 23,
26 (1976).
36.
See Mae C. Quinn, The Other Missouri Model: Systemic Juvenile
Injustice in the Show-Me State, 78 MO. L. REV. 1193, 1227–28 (2015)
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The appendix explains that the determination to waive a
child to adult court rests on the following summarized factors:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the
community . . . .
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an
aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or
property . . . .
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there
is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to
return an indictment . . . .
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the juvenile’s associates in the
alleged offense are adults . . . .
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as
determined by consideration of his home, environmental
situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including
previous contacts with [police and the juvenile justice
system].
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile . . . by
the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court. 37

Thus, the Kent decision did not expressly address the
possibility of, or process for, juvenile transfer in the federal
Article III judicial system—which, as will be further discussed
below, does not maintain separate forums known as juvenile
courts. 38

(describing the appendix in Kent as a standard adopted by most states for
purposes of considering juvenile transfer—other than Missouri, which has
rejected the “prosecutive merit” component).
37.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 566–67.
38.
Interestingly, while Kent’s matter arose in the District of Columbia,
which in many respects is considered a federal venue, the District maintains
its own juvenile court system like all states. See id.
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B. State Sentencing Matters and Evolving Standard of Decency
for Youth
While Kent and Gault established basic due process rights
of juveniles facing trial or transfer in state court, a separate
body of Supreme Court jurisprudence addresses punishment
and sentencing of juveniles. This series of cases, which emerged
over the course of the twenty-first century, is rooted in the
understanding that society’s perception of youth is evolving. 39
This is in large part because of modern scientific findings
surrounding adolescent brain development. 40 These cases
provide answers to “one of the substantive issues left aside in
Kent: whether some child sentences are just too harsh to
withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” 41
In 1988, during the get tough era of the 1970s to the 1990s,
the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma 42 considered the
constitutionality of a death sentence for a juvenile convicted of
first-degree murder for an offense committed at the age of
fifteen. 43 Noting that there was “complete or near unanimity
among all 50 States and the District of Columbia in treating a
person under 16 as a minor” and that juries infrequently
imposed the death penalty on such juveniles in the second half
of the twentieth century, the Thompson court concluded there

39.
See Mae C. Quinn, Introduction: Evolving Standards in Juvenile
Justice from Gault to Graham and Beyond, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 12
(2012) (describing how the evolving standards of decency doctrine has been
expanded in youth justice cases).
40.
See id. (explaining that thinking has changed regarding child
sentencing practices through the consideration of developmental concerns).
41.
Id. at 11.
42.
See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818 (1988) (holding that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of someone
who committed first-degree murder at age fifteen or younger); see also Quinn,
supra note 39, at 11 (describing how nation has moved back and forth from
being protectionist to prosecutorial in its approaches to youth who break the
law).
43.
See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818; see also Quinn, supra note 39, at 11
(commenting on how the courts analyzed the case).
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was a national consensus against sentencing offenders younger
than sixteen to death. 44
The Court, “bringing its independent judgment to bear on
the permissibility of the death penalty for a 15-year-old
offender” 45 additionally stated that “there is also broad
agreement on the proposition that adolescents as a class are less
mature and responsible than adults” and that there was no
penological justification for the execution of fifteen-year-old
offenders. 46
But the Court and the nation were not ready to concede that
juveniles of all ages were “categorically less culpable” than
adults. 47 In fact, in 1995, a Princeton professor, “prompted by
rising crime rates and a handful of high-profile incidents,”
coined the term “super-predator” to describe predominately
young black juvenile offenders. 48 This prompted an “American
social war” through “rhetorical excess, political extremism,
graphic media, punitive policies, and, perhaps most critically,
the casting of the enemy as a moral reprobate.” 49 Thus “nearly
every state in the country enacted laws that made it easier to
try kids as adults” and took other steps to treat them more
harshly for childhood wrongdoing. 50 Thousands of youth,
predominately Black and Brown males, were incarcerated as a
result of this frenzy. 51
In 2005, seventeen years after the Court’s decision in
Thompson, and as the super-predator myth was finally
debunked, the Supreme Court held that sentencing any juvenile
offender under the age of eighteen to death was unconstitutional

44.
45.
46.

See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824, 832.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316

47.
(2002)).
48.
Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young
Black Males in America, J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281, 281 (2012).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 281.
51.
See id. at 282 (commenting on the mass incarceration that resulted
as a consequence of legislation making it easier to try juveniles as adults).
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under the Eighth Amendment. 52 In Roper v. Simmons, 53 the
Court followed the same “two-pronged methodology” as in
Thompson. 54 The Court first “consider[ed] ‘objective indicia of
society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and
state practice’ to determine whether there is a national
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.” 55 The Court
also brought its own independent judgment to bear, again, to
confirm that as a general rule youthful offenders needed to be
treated differently from adults. 56
Holding that juveniles were now categorically barred from
receiving the death penalty, the Supreme Court identified three
key differences between juveniles and adults that “render
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders.” 57 The Court recognized those three differences as: (1)
“a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults . . . .
result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions,” 58 (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure,” 59 and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult.” 60 These differences demonstrated
that the death penalty for kids amounted to cruel and unusual

52.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (holding that
sentencing juvenile offenders to death is unconstitutional).
53.
See id. at 559.
54.
See Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion:
Juvenile Sentencing Schemes After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
293, 302–04 (2015) (describing how Roper adopted the two-pronged method set
out by Thompson).
55.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
572).
56.
See id. (stating that juvenile offenders should not be treated the same
as adult offenders).
57.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
58.
Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
59.
Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982)).
60.
Id. at 570.
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punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, Thompson’s
rule was extended to all juveniles under the age of eighteen. 61
In 2011, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida 62
identified and abolished another unconstitutional juvenile
sentencing practice. 63 The issue in Graham was whether a
juvenile offender who did not kill could receive juvenile life
without parole (JLWOP). 64 To evaluate JLWOP as a
constitutional punishment for non-homicide juvenile offenders,
the Court “look[ed] beyond historical conceptions to ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.’” 65 Additionally, the Court’s analysis focused
on “the concept of proportionality [] central to the Eighth
Amendment.” 66
While the State in Graham argued that there was “no
national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue”
because “[t]hirty-seven States as well as the District of
Columbia permit sentences of life without parole for a juvenile
nonhomicide offender in some circumstances,” the Court
disagreed. 67 In fact, the Court cited a nationwide study of
juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving JLWOP sentences and
concluded that “the sentencing practice . . . under consideration
[was] exceedingly rare” and that therefore a “community
consensus” did exist against the practice. 68 The Court
additionally recognized that aside from determining whether a
national consensus existed, “[t]he judicial exercise of
independent judgment require[d] consideration of the
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in
61.

Id. at 570–71.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that “[t]he
Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a
juvenile offender who did not commit homicide”).
63.
See id. at 48 (abolishing juvenile life without parole in non-homicide
matters).
64.
See id. at 52.
65.
Id. at 58 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
66.
Id. at 59.
67.
Id. at 62.
68.
Id. at 67.
62.
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question” and whether JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses
“serve[d] legitimate penological goals.” 69
In grappling with these issues, the Court again turned to
adolescent brain science. The Court found that “developments
in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental
differences between juvenile and adult minds,” reaffirming the
concerns laid out in Roper. 70 The Graham Court thus held
nonhomicide juvenile offenders did not deserve the harshest
possible punishment. 71
The Graham case is important not only because it
invalidated an extreme sentencing practice for juveniles, but
also because it reaffirmed that youth differ from adults in terms
of culpability and amenability to rehabilitation. Additionally,
Thompson, Roper, and Graham all paved the way for the Court’s
findings in Miller and Montgomery.
In Miller v. Alabama, 72 decided in 2012, the Supreme Court
held that a mandatory juvenile life without parole sentence was
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 73 This was
because the Miller Court recognized that a sentencing scheme
that mandates JLWOP “prevents those meting out punishment
from considering a juvenile’s ‘lessened culpability’ and greater
‘capacity for change.’” 74 The Miller decision was a consolidation
of two state court cases involving fourteen-year-old offenders
who were sentenced to JLWOP upon being convicted of
murder. 75 Both boys were certified as adults for their crimes,
and therefore, “[i]n neither case did the sentencing authority
have any discretion to impose a different punishment” other
than the mandatory JLWOP sentence. 76

69.

Id.
Id. at 68.
See id. at 69 (asserting that crimes other than homicide deserve
serious punishment but are morally different than the act of killing).
72.
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that
mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles is unconstitutional).
73.
Id. at 465.
74.
Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 74 (2010).
75.
Id. at 465.
76.
Id. at 465, 466, 469.
70.
71.
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The Miller Court turned to the findings in Roper and
Graham that “establish[ed] that children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing” because of
their “diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform.” 77 The Court yet again relied on scientific studies to
underscore differences between juveniles and adults. 78
Additionally, the Court cited Graham in stating that “the
characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken rationales for
punishment, can render a life-without-parole sentence
disproportionate.” 79
The Miller Court determined mandatory JLWOP sentences
contravene “Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational principle:
that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile
offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.” 80
An automatic death behind bars term would “preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the
wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” 81
For all of these reasons, JLWOP was to be imposed in only the
rarest cases—where a child’s actions reflected “irreparable
corruption” and not “transient immaturity.” 82 And four years
after Miller, the Court extended the decision’s reach
retroactively in Montgomery v. Louisiana 83 to provide relief to
the over 2,000 youth already serving mandatory JLWOP
sentences across the country. 84

77.

Id. at 471.
See id. at 471–72 (discussing and citing the studies discussed in Roper
and Graham).
79.
Id. at 473.
80.
Id. at 474.
81.
Id. at 476.
82.
See id. at 479–80.
83.
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 724 (2016) (holding that
a retroactive application of relief should be applied to youths serving
mandatory JLWOP sentences across the country).
84.
See id. at 732 (explaining how Miller “announced a substantive rule
that is retroactive in cases on collateral review”).
78.
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III. The Untold Story—Federal Prosecution and Sentencing of
Youth as Adults
The very same day the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Montgomery, President Barack Obama issued his
own important juvenile justice decision. 85 As noted, Montgomery
made clear that the ban on automatic life without parole
sentences for youth applied retrospectively—focusing on
youthful offenders held in state prisons. 86 In contrast, President
Obama directed the nation’s attention to youth in federal
prisons and jails—a population that had received almost no
attention in fifty years of U.S. Supreme Court decisions relating
to juveniles. 87 In his declaration, made public in part by an op-ed
written for the Washington Post, the President issued a ban on
the use of solitary confinement for youth in federal custody. 88
News coverage that followed President Obama’s
announcement suggested that youth prosecution in federal
court is a rare occurrence and insignificant issue. 89 This,
however, reflected a misconception that persists today. 90
Indeed, while it is not common knowledge, our federal district
85.
See Barack Obama, Op-Ed, Barack Obama: Why We Must Rethink
(Jan.
25,
2016),
https://
Solitary
Confinement,
WASH. POST
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barack-obama-why-we-must-rethinksolitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-8965-0607e0e265ce
_story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/J8SZ-JVGF].
86.
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732–38.
87.
Obama, supra note 85.
88.
See id. (hoping that by “banning solitary confinement for juveniles”
and “expanding treatment for mentally ill,” that these steps would “serve as a
model for state and local corrections systems”).
89.
See, e.g., David Smith, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement of
Juveniles in Federal Prisons, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2016), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/26/obama-bans-solitaryconfinement-of-juveniles-in-federal-prisons (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
(declaring that “just 13 juveniles” were known to have been placed in federal
solitary confinement between 2014 and 2015) [https://perma.cc/VDP7-3ZTT].
90.
See Arvo Mikkanen, Federal Prosecution of Juveniles, 58 U.S. ATT’YS’
BULL. 52, 52 (2010) (“Contrary to the common misconception that the federal
government generally does not prosecute juveniles, there are a significant
number of offenders under the age of 18 who . . . are subject to federal court
proceedings . . . .”).

538

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 523 (2020)

courts process a sizeable number of young people each year. 91
Many are ultimately prosecuted as adults on federal charges. 92
For a range of reasons described further below, it is difficult to
obtain a completely accurate count of young people charged in
federal court as juveniles or transferred to be prosecuted as
adults in the federal system. 93 But what can be discerned from
both history and data is deeply troubling.
A. History, Federal Statutes, and Current Practices
Few realize that youth have faced prosecution, transfer,
and adult sentencing in our federal court system since our
nation’s founding. Although there was a wave of writing about
federal prosecution of youth at the turn of this century, little
scholarship or other examination of this phenomenon has
happened in the last twenty years. As noted, at the start of the
last century, individual states began creating specialized
juvenile courts to provide a less harsh setting for youth accused
of wrongdoing. 94 The first specialized court opened in Illinois in
1899, and by 1925, nearly every state in the nation had its own

91.

Id.
See id. (noting that “juvenile offenders have long been subject to
federal court proceedings” and “the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act” “refined the special treatment of juveniles who have
committed violations of criminal law within the federal system”).
93.
Compare Juvenile Law Center, President’s Ban on Solitary
Confinement is a Model for States, JUV. L. CTR. (Jan. 28, 2016), https://jlc.org
/news/presidents-ban-solitary-confinement-model-states (last visited Mar. 3,
2020) (noting hundreds of youth were in federal custody at the time of
President Obama’s Executive Order on juvenile solitary confinement) [https://
perma.cc/J9MJ-43UN?type=image], with Beth Schwartzkapfel, There are
Practically No Juveniles in Federal Prison—Here’s Why, THE MARSHALL
PROJECT (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/27
/there-are-practically-no-juveniles-in-federal-prison-here-s-why (last visited
Mar. 3, 2020) (reporting that there were fewer than 30 teens in federal custody
at the time of President Obama’s announcement) [https://perma.cc/WAY9XTJP].
94.
See Quinn, supra note 39, at 2–3 (examining how the Progressive Era
led reformers to establish “specialized juvenile courts” to “protect wayward
children rather than punish them like adults”).
92.
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juvenile court system. 95 The informal and ad hoc features of
these settings is what ultimately led the Supreme Court to
establish the juvenile court standards in Gault and Kent. Article
III courts, however, never created their own separate system for
alleged youthful offenders. 96
1. Federal Court Practices and Juvenile Transfer—Generally
Instead, the federal system largely resisted the reforms
taking place across the states during the early part of the
twentieth century. 97 Federal courts simply continued to process
the cases of children facing federal criminal charges following
the common law, not much differently than in the colonial era. 98
For instance, in 1895, in the case of United States v. Safford, 99
a seventeen-year-old was charged with a federal offense relating
to the embezzlement of mail from the postal service. 100 In that
matter, the court seemed concerned about the defendant’s pro
se status in light of the possible legal defenses that could be
advanced. 101 Thus, the court appointed counsel for the
defendant, but no mention was made of any specialized

95.
See id. (discussing the history of the juvenile court system); see also
Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104–22 (1909)
(describing state-level juvenile court innovations and calling for a broader
embrace of the model).
96.
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL AND INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE
JUSTICE 157 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001) (discussing how youth justice
matters have been handled historically in the federal system).
97.
See JAMES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30822, JUVENILE
DELINQUENTS AND FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW:
THE FEDERAL JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY ACT AND RELATED MATTERS 1–2 (2018) (outlining options
afforded to federal authorities when juveniles allegedly violate federal
criminal laws).
98.
See id. at 1 (“By 1930, the Wickersham Commission reported that
only the federal government continued to uniformly treat children, charged
with a crime, as adults.”).
99.
See United States v. Safford, 66 F. 942, 947 (E.D. Mo. 1895) (holding
that the “defendant’s plea of guilty will not be accepted . . . until he shall have
had opportunity to consult with counsel” appointed by the court).
100.
Id. at 943.
101.
See id. at 942–43.
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treatment given the defendant’s youth. 102 Indeed, he faced the
same possible penalty as any adult. 103
Similarly, in Ex Parte Beaver 104 in 1921, a writ of habeas
corpus was considered on behalf of a young person who had lied
about his age to join the army, deserted, and then was
prosecuted under federal law. 105 There, the court rejected the
teen’s application to receive different treatment because he had
not yet reached majority. 106 Instead, the federal district court
explained:
[A] minor of the age of discretion is answerable for his
criminal offenses, just as much as is an adult. If, therefore, a
minor has misrepresented his age, and has thereby
committed the offense of fraudulent enlistment, or if, after
enlisting, he has been guilty of desertion, insubordination,
communication with the enemy, or any one of the many
offenses against military law, it is difficult to suggest a valid
reason why he might not be detained and tried by the
military authorities for such offenses. 107

In 1938, Congress finally codified federal practices for youth
prosecutions in the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act
(FJDA). 108 The law made clear that the U.S. Attorney General
could prosecute youth in federal court for crimes where the
federal government had a substantial interest, even if the state

102.

Id. at 947.
Id at 942–47.
See Ex parte Beaver, 271 F. 493, 498 (N.D. Ohio 1921) (holding that
a minor is answerable for criminal offenses “just as much as is an adult” if a
minor “has misrepresented his age, and has thereby committed the offense of
fraudulent enlistment”).
105.
See id. at 493–94 (discussing the minor defendant’s background).
106.
See id. at 498 (concluding that “a minor of the age of discretion is
answerable for his criminal offenses, just as much as is an adult”).
107.
Id.
108.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 116,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-116-juveniledelinquency-prosecution-introduction (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2020) (explaining how “[p]rior to 1938, there was no federal legislation
providing for special treatment for juveniles”) [https://perma.cc/79T2-2E5G].
103.
104.
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where the child resided had a juvenile court. 109 Under the FJDA,
the Department of Justice was not only allowed to file youthful
offender matters in federal courts, but in some cases, it could
seek a “transfer” to have such youth face adult prosecution and
sentencing. 110 This law singularly controlled federal prosecution
of youth for nearly forty years. 111
Thereafter, however, the 1974 Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) was passed to amend the
FJDA, purportedly in part to account for the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kent. 112 In 1984, the Federal Sentencing Reform Act
and other later legislative enactments sought to further
modernize federal prosecution of juveniles. 113 In the end, the
U.S. Department of Justice was still permitted to seek child
“transfer” from the juvenile delinquency side of the federal
docket to the criminal side—to have such youth face
prosecution, sentencing, and imprisonment like any adult
criminal defendant. 114

109.
See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Juvenile Courts, Etc. § 27 (2020) (describing the
“[c]ertification of state proceedings to federal court under Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act”). The second essay in this series, which will be published by
this journal in the days ahead, will further explore non-criminal federal
juvenile delinquency practices under 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–5043.
110.
See DOYLE, supra note 97, at 2–3 (highlighting how “any 16- or
17-year-old accused of a crime which carried a maximum penalty of death, life
imprisonment, or imprisonment for ten years or more” was to be transferred
under “the 1974 revision of federal juvenile law”).
111.
Id. at 2.
112.
See, e.g., Legislation, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about/legislation (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/TPG7-FWA8?type=image]. Many in the field know that the JJDPA
helped create the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP), which funds and supports state-level juvenile justice reforms and
initiatives. See Taylor Imperiale, Keeping Juvenile Conduct in Juvenile Court:
Why the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act Does Not and Should Not Contain
a Ratification Exception, 13 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 287, 291 (2019) (“Congress also
amended the FJDA so as to align the federal government’s juvenile justice
policies with the dictates of Kent v. United States.”).
113.
See DOYLE, supra note 97, at 2–3.
114.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 119,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-119-referralstate-authorities (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
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Taken together, these laws seemed to make clear that the
federal government was interested in focusing on youth crime
even more than before. For instance, some say the new statutory
scheme helped to create a “more active federal juvenile justice
system.” 115 Similarly, the federal system clearly embraced the
super-predator myth that was debunked just a few years
later. 116
For instance, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCC Act) 117 made a “dramatic change”
in expanding the range of cases that could result in juvenile
transfer, covering more crimes (such as assault and drug
crimes), and more youth (including those as young as thirteen,
with some exceptions for Native American youth living in
Indian Country). 118 The VCC Act also suggested more youth
should face adult sanctions for selling drugs. 119 The Act noted
that if a young person involved others in drug sale activity, they
ought to be seen as a leader for whom transfer was

(describing how alleged juvenile delinquents can be surrendered to state
authorities) [https://perma.cc/K5TL-8RQ5?type=image].
115.
Alicia K. Embley, Federal Jurisdiction over Juveniles: Who Decides?,
64 MO. L. REV. 171, 173 (1999); see also Imperiale, supra note 112, at 290–91
(describing how the legislative history for the FJDA expressly notes a desire
for further federal involvement in juvenile justice enforcement—but at the
same time might be read as seeking to limit the federal government’s role).
116.
See Laura K. Langley, Giving up on Youth: Danger of Recent Attempts
to Federalize Juvenile Crime, 25 J. JUV. L. 1, 10–15 (2005) (laying out the
“recent legislative efforts to increase federal jurisdiction over juveniles”); see
also Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests, 2016 in Juvenile Justice
Statistics, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Dec. 2018), https://
ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/251861.pdf (including chart
reflecting massive decline in juvenile crime since the middle of the 1990s)
[https://perma.cc/RZ4Q-WBHE].
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701–14223 (2018).
118.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 129,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-129conditions-precedent-motion-transfer (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited
Mar. 3, 2020) (describing conditions that “must be met before a Motion to
Transfer|B251 can be filed”) [https://perma.cc/FJG5-BTYP].
119.
See id. (listing alleged violations such as “drug trafficking,” “drug
importation,” “drugs on vessels,” and “drug manufacturing”).
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appropriate. 120 On the other hand, “absence of this [leadership]
factor” did not “preclude transfer” in such cases. 121
Strong interest in federal youth transfer during the
mid-1990s is also evidenced by the training literature provided
to Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) during that time, still
available as a suggested online resource for AUSAs today. 122 For
instance, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno’s warnings from
1994 were included in the Department’s Criminal Resource
Manual:
Clearly, youth violence is the greatest single crime problem
that this nation faces. I have asked United States Attorneys,
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and our
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to do
everything possible to address the issues of youth violence.
It is not only a criminal justice problem but it’s one of the
great public health problems we face in America today. 123

The same section went on with a 1995 quote from Attorney
General Reno:
A close look at the nation’s young people discloses something
that is very alarming. Since 1985, we have seen an increase
in the level of youth violence that is simply staggering,
particularly for youth age fourteen to seventeen. . . . This
surge in youth violence is particularly frightening when we
120.
See id. (describing how the “Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 made a dramatic change in this law regarding
applicability of transfer for juveniles younger than fifteen who commit certain
violations”).
121.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 133,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-133-secondfactor-nature-alleged-offense (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar. 3,
2020) [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 133] [https://perma.cc
/E4KN-TQPN].
122.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 101,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-101-federalprosecution-juveniles (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
(providing brief remarks regarding the manual’s purpose) [https://perma.cc
/PEJ9-KUFY?type=image].
123.
See id. (recounting U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno’s remarks from
a Weekly Press Conference at the Department of Justice held on Oct. 27,
1994).
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realize that it occurred, for the most part, in a period when
the number of young people in the category of age fourteen
to seventeen was decreasing in the United States. . . . The
nation’s demographic data, makes quite clear, that the next
twenty years will produce a significant increase in the
number of young people, fourteen to seventeen.
Unmistakably, the current rise of youth violence presages
the next generation of even more tragic crime and violence
unless we do something now. 124

Other parts of the manual offered stronger condemnation,
describing teens as drug traffickers, murderous gang members,
and violent individuals often beyond rehabilitative
intervention. 125 Even today, AUSAs are informed that the
Department of Justice’s Organized Crime and Gang Division
are the suggested point of contact and consultation when
dealing with a juvenile in federal court proceedings. 126 Such
advice reflects an embedded assumption, that further villainizes
and adultifies youth who find themselves in contact with federal
officials.
Today, when a child faces charges in federal court, the
Department of Justice can seek to prosecute them as an adult
under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 127 Section 5032 provides two avenues to
124.

Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 102,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-102-juvenilecrime-facts (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar. 3, 2020) [https://
perma.cc/AMP4-G79V?type=image]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
RESOURCES MANUAL § 149, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminalresource-manual-149-conclusion (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar.
3, 2020) (quoting President Bill Clinton who said the federal justice system
was dealing with “thirty years of developing social problems in the family and
on the streets with crime and violence and drugs and gangs” that demanded
accountability by way of “potent federal criminal statutes”) [https://perma.cc
/6799-9VBC?type=image].
126.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-8.000, https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-8000-juveniles (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last
visited Mar. 3, 2020) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-8.000] (“The Organized
Crime and Gang Section of the Criminal Division is available for consultation
on all issues pertaining to the prosecution of juveniles . . . .”) [https://perma.cc
/GAD7-YGEX?type=image].
127.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018) (describing “[d]elinquency proceedings in
district courts” and the “transfer for criminal prosecution”).
125.
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adult sentencing for children. 128 The first is mandatory transfer.
Under this provision, juveniles age sixteen or older, seen as
repeat violent offenders, face automatic adult prosecution in
federal court. 129 The other possibility is discretionary transfer.
Using this avenue, the Department of Justice may ask the
district court to convert certain matters involving children age
thirteen or older from federal juvenile delinquency proceedings
to adult prosecutions. 130 During a discretionary federal transfer
hearing, Article III district court judges consider the following
factors:
1. The age and social background of the juvenile;
2. The nature of the alleged offense;
3. The extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency
record;
4. The juvenile’s present intellectual development and
psychological maturity;
5. The nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s
response to such efforts; and
6. The availability of programs designed to treat the
juvenile’s behavioral problems. 131

If a youth has her case transferred under either provision,
she will be prosecuted as an adult in federal court and face
sentencing in the same manner as an adult criminal
defendant. 132 Both provisions, however, appear to present
constitutional concerns—in light of Kent and given the Court’s
evolving standards of decency jurisprudence.

128.

Id.
Id.
Id. As will be further discussed, there is an important exception under
this law for Native American youth age thirteen or fourteen.
131.
See id. (stating that the following factors “shall be considered” “in
assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice”).
132.
See id. (“[T]he court shall consider the extent to which the juvenile
played a leadership role . . . or otherwise influenced other persons to take part
in criminal activities . . . . Such a factor, if found to exist, shall weigh in favor
of a transfer to adult status . . . .”).
129.
130.
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2. Discretionary Transfer, Side-Stepping Kent, and Ignoring
Youth
There are similarities between the current federal
discretionary transfer factors under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 and the
factors embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent, when it
sought to protect against arbitrarily transferring youth to adult
courts for prosecution. Interestingly, however, unlike most
states, the federal government did not adopt all of the Kent
factors. 133 The differences are such that juvenile transfer in the
federal system would seem more likely than state systems that
follow Kent.
First and foremost, as in the state of Missouri, which is
another outlier—the federal juvenile transfer statute does not
expressly require a finding of “probable cause” or “prosecutive
merit” prior to allowing for a youth’s case to be moved to the
adult criminal side of the prosecution docket. 134 Training
materials for Assistant U.S. Attorneys reiterate this point,
noting that under the second statutory factor—“nature of the
alleged offense”—“the court shall assume the juvenile
committed the offense.” 135 It is recommended that the assigned
federal prosecutors present some proof on this point. 136 They,
nevertheless, are not directed to satisfy the kind of probable
cause standards Kent expected. Thus, it seems clear that some
cases in federal court may result in children facing adult
prosecution while questions exist about the strength of the
charges and whether the accused youth is the actual culprit.
Second, while the federal statute requires the court to
evaluate the “nature of the alleged offense” when deciding
whether to transfer, it does not provide any express guidance for
what this means. 137 Kent’s factors surely are not perfect and can
133.

See Quinn, supra note 39, at 9–16 (outlining post-Kent decisions).
See id. at 12–13 (reviewing and analyzing Roper v. Simmons); see also
generally 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018).
135.
See CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 133, supra note 121 (describing
how “[t]his can be established through testimony of the case agent or other
knowledgeable law enforcement officers”).
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
134.
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also result in transfer of youth who might be good candidates for
rehabilitative treatment. They at least require courts to focus
on the state of mind of the youthful offender to ascertain
whether the offense was committed in a premeditated or willful
manner that might demonstrate mature reflection on the
matter before acting. 138
Federal courts are not provided with such clear parameters
and have broad discretion when considering how the “nature” of
the crime should be evaluated. 139 Even the Department of
Justice’s training manual talks about drug weight as being a
factor that might make a crime seem “particularly serious,”
meriting the assumption that the child should be held
accountable in the same way as an adult—regardless of mens
rea. 140
Finally, much of the Department of Justice’s recommended
interpretation of the 18 U.S.C. § 5032 factors, and the
authorities upon which it relies, pre-date the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Roper, Graham, Miller and Montgomery. 141
As noted, these cases all provide more nuanced legal
understandings of the teenage mind and how modern scientific
discoveries around adolescent development should be utilized
when evaluating youthful wrongdoing. As such they debunk
decades of urban myths and false assumptions about youth as
behaving like, and being as culpable as, fully grown adults.

138.
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966) (embracing
appendix that set forth specific factors to be evaluated by “the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction over such offenses will be
waived”).
139.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018).
140.
See CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 133, supra note 121 (stating that
“[t]he court may be impressed that the offense may involve a large amount of
drugs unlikely to be encountered in a first time exposure to the elicit
business”); see also United States v. Elwood, 993 F.2d 1146, 1148–49 (5th Cir.
1993) (upholding a transfer of a juvenile to be tried as an adult in drug crime
case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032).
141.
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 5032; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 551
(2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 718 (2016).
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For instance, Roper and its progeny make clear that the
brain is in a state of underdevelopment and maturation. 142 Yet
the Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Manual relies on
a 1989 case, claiming that older teens should be transferred
because the “more mature a juvenile becomes, the harder it is to
reform the juvenile’s values and behavior.” 143 Similarly, the
Manual talks about youth who fail to show remorse as
demonstrating adult maturity, 144 and states that youth with
“street-wise intellect or precociousness” should similarly be seen
as worthy candidates for transfer. 145 Such assessments,
however, reflect an outdated understanding of adolescent
behavior, which evaluates the actions and reactions of young
people in light of reasonable adults rather than reasonable
youth. 146
3. Mandatory Juvenile Transfer as Inconsistent with Miller
The federal juvenile transfer statute also appears to run
afoul of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Supreme Court’s
142.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (stating that “a lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in
adults and are more understandable among the young”); see also Graham, 560
U.S. at 72–73 (discussing Roper and how “[i]t is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime
reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption”).
143.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 132, https://
www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-132-first-factor-ageand-social-background-juvenile (last updated Jan. 22, 2020) (last visited Mar.
5, 2020) (citing United States v. H.S., 717 F. Supp. 911, 917 (D.D.C. 1989))
[https://perma.cc/J5MZ-9E9R].
144.
See CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 133, supra note 121 (citing
United States v. M.H., 901 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (E.D. Tex. 1995)).
145.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCES MANUAL § 135,
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-135-fourthfactor-juveniles-present-intellectual-development-and (last updated Jan. 22,
2020) (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (citing United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868
(2d Cir. 1995)) [https://perma.cc/6W82-EL7E?type=image].
146.
See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272–81 (2011)
(discussing how “this Court has drawn these commonsense conclusions . . .
[and] observed that children ‘generally are less mature and responsible than
adults’”).
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decision in Miller v. Alabama. Although Miller’s narrow holding
banned automatic life without parole sentences for youth, its
teachings have broader implications. That is, Miller can be read
as precluding any blanket rule that fails to account for the
individual features of a young person and their circumstances.
But 18 U.S.C. § 5032 does just that. The statute provides that
certain repeat offender cases involving youth “shall be
transferred to the appropriate district court of the
United States for criminal prosecution.” 147
Here, again, it does not appear that the Department of
Justice has revisited the practice of seeking mandatory transfer
in light of Miller’s 2012 mandates. 148 Even in its current Justice
Manual for line attorneys, updated in 2018, the section on
Motion to Transfer reiterates mandatory transfer as an
appropriate avenue of action without any mention of recent
Supreme Court caselaw. 149 But after Miller, jurisdictions across
the country began reconsidering all kinds of mandatory rules
relating to youth facing prosecution. 150 As for transfer in
particular, Ohio struck down its mandatory transfer law as
denying youth appropriate individualized determinations and
process under the Constitution. 151 These post-Roper
developments cast serious doubt on the Ninth Circuit’s 2000
determination in United States v. Juvenile, 152 which upheld the

147.
148.

18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018).
See JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-8.000, supra note 126 (reflecting no reference
to Miller).
149.
See id. § 9-8.130.
150.
See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 403–04 (Iowa 2014) (holding
“the remedy in this case is to resentence Lyle so a judge can at least consider
a sentencing option other than mandatory minimum imprisonment”).
151.
See Carol Taylor, Mandatory Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts is
Unconstitutional,
CT.
NEWS
OHIO
(Dec.
22,
2016),
http://
www.courtnewsohio.gov/cases/2016/SCO/1222/150677.asp#.Xl7lrC2ZN24
(last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (discussing how the Ohio Supreme Court ruled “that
mandatory transfer of juveniles to the common pleas courts violates juveniles’
right to due process as guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution”) [https://perma.cc
/YA85-Z8CK].
152.
See United States v. Juvenile, 228 F.3d 987, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)
(upholding mandatory juvenile transfer under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 and rejecting
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federal mandatory transfer statute against a constitutional
challenge.
B. Invisible Unworthies, Missing Data, and Other Unanswered
Questions
As noted, when President Obama outlawed the practice of
solitary confinement for juveniles in federal jails and prisons,
many were completely surprised to learn that youth were being
prosecuted in federal courts—much less sentenced as adults or
housed in solitary confinement in federal prisons. At the time of
President Obama’s announcement, one reliable authority
declared that there were several hundred federally detained
youth. 153 In contrast, a different youth justice group stated there
were fewer than thirty youth in federal custody on the day of the
announcement. 154 This conflicting snapshot demonstrates
another problem of juvenile prosecution and transfer in federal
court—the nearly impossible task of obtaining a clear picture of
how many juvenile delinquency and transfer cases have been
processed in the federal system in years past, or even today.
At least some statistics suggest that juvenile case numbers
in federal court increased—not decreased—from the mid-to-late
1990s. 155 For instance, the Administrative Offices of the U.S.
Courts reported that in 1994, juvenile delinquency matters were
commenced against only seventy-seven youth in the federal

a claim that such a practice is unconstitutional as violative of due process or
equal protection of the law).
153.
See Juvenile Law Center, supra note 93 (“[A] few hundred youth are
confined in federal prisons and jails . . . .”).
154.
Schwartzkapfel, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
155.
See Malcolm C. Young & Jenni Gainsborough, Prosecuting Juveniles
in Adult Court, THE SENT’G PROJECT, Jan. 2000, at 2 (“Fear of out-of-control
juvenile crime and a coming generation of ‘super-predators,’ compellingly if
erroneously described publicly and to Congress in 1996, has undermined the
traditional practice of treating young offenders as different from adult
criminals—less culpable because of their age and more amenable to
rehabilitation.”).
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system. 156 In 1997, the number increased to 218. 157 And the next
year, 1998, saw 245 federal juvenile court filings. 158
Interestingly, these numbers conflict with other sources which
provide different data for the same time period. For instance,
the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Programs
reported that 134 juveniles were actually adjudicated
delinquent in federal court in 1994—with more cases filed but
resulting in dismissals or acquittals. 159 And neither of these sets
of statistics would appear to account for youth who were not
adjudicated delinquent but instead found guilty as adults.
A 2014 report from the National Center for Juvenile
Justice—which in part relies upon 2011 findings of the Urban
Institute—suggests relatively high numbers of youth were
federally processed and transferred up through 2008. 160 But it
also raises serious questions about the reliability of the data
available. For instance, the report claims that between 1999 and
2008, federal agents arrested more than 3,200 children. 161 That
reflects an average annual federal arrest rate of 320 youth. 162
The Urban Institute further found that approximately
eighty-five percent of these arrests resulted in findings of guilt
in federal court—either by way of juvenile delinquency finding
or transfer. 163 Yet, somehow, during this same period 3,500
individuals were committed to the federal Bureau of Prisons for
156.
See David Adair & Daniel Cunningham, Pending Juvenile
Legislation, FED. PROB. J. 8, 8 (1999) (“In recent years, Congress has expressed
considerable interest in amending the federal statutes governing the
prosecution of juveniles and has proposed a number of bills that would result
in significant changes to the existing juvenile provisions, including a potential
increase in the number of juvenile proceedings.”).
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
John Scalia, Juvenile Delinquents in the Federal Criminal Justice
System, BUREAU JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP., Feb. 1997, at 2.
160.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT 109 (Melissa Sickmund & Charles
Puzzanchera eds., 2014) (stating that federal agencies arrested an average of
320 juveniles each year between 1999 and 2008).
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
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offenses committed when they were juveniles under age
eighteen. 164 Of this number, only 1,335 were serving adult
prison sentences following transfer—the rest were placed as
juvenile delinquents through the federal court system. 165
Some of the apparent inconsistencies and tensions in data
may, in part, be explained by terminology. Words like “juvenile”
and “conviction” may not be applied consistently by various
reports and agencies. 166 And entities like the U.S. Sentencing
Commission have issued studies that include juveniles under
the age of eighteen under the banner of “youthful offenders,”
which covers all defendants up to age twenty-five. 167 But the
dearth of reliable data, we believe, is also because of the near
singular focus on state juvenile case data collection—even by
the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention. For instance, the agency’s website provides a link
for readers to obtain updated national information about
juveniles tried as adults. 168 However, the material on that
webpage relates only to state juvenile transfer proceedings. 169
Thus, as noted by the Urban Institute, “it is exceedingly difficult
to distinguish juveniles prosecuted as adults from juveniles
processed as delinquents in the data” provided for the federal
system. 170

164.

Id.
Id.
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL AND INST. OF MED., supra note 96, at 26
(explaining that sources of data vary and may reflect different crime rates and
trends).
167.
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (2017) (defining youthful offenders as those who are
twenty-five or younger at the time they are sentenced in the federal system).
168.
See Juveniles in Court, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PROGRAMS,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/court/faqs.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2020)
(providing answers to questions ranging from juvenile population
characteristics to number of juveniles in corrections centers) [https://perma.cc
/HS4N-3KDK?type=image].
169.
See id. (describing how procedures related to juveniles tried as adults
vary from state to state).
170.
See WILLIAM ADAMS ET AL., TRIBAL YOUTH IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, at x (2011) (“All juvenile cases in the federal system begin as juvenile
165.
166.
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In addition, all of the information on the OJJDP website is
considerably outdated—with the most recent “updates” on adult
prosecution of youth running through 2017 only. 171 What is
more, the 114-page 2017 Juvenile Court Statistics Manual,
issued jointly by OJJDP, NCJJ, and the National Institute of
Justice, makes no mention whatsoever of youth cases being
processed in the federal court system. 172 Thus, it is almost
impossible to ascertain an accurate number of juveniles
prosecuted as adults in the federal system between 2008 and
today. And given the current culture within the federal
administration, and its treatment of vulnerable youth at the
border and otherwise, this dearth of data is especially
concerning.
IV. Categories, Case Studies, and Implications of Federal Court
Juvenile Transfer
A. Native American Youth
Some authorities claim that between 1999 and 2008, almost
half of all youth charged in federal court were those from tribal
lands. 173 Yet, Native youth reflect a very small proportion of the
national population—just 1.6 percent. 174 This massive
disproportionality is arguably in part because of the lack of
prosecutorial resources and secure detention facilities on tribal
delinquency proceedings, and it is challenging to determine the proportion of
juveniles that are transferred to adult status and handled as criminal cases.”).
171.
See Juveniles in Court, supra note 168 (providing some statistics that
were last updated in 2013).
172.
See generally SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L
CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2017 (2019) (focusing
on state juvenile courts).
173.
See ADAMS, supra note 170, at ix (“Tribal youth represented about 40–
55% of all juveniles in the federal system, depending on the stage in the
system.”).
174.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-591, NATIVE AMERICAN
YOUTH: INVOLVEMENT IN JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION ON GRANTS TO
HELP ADDRESS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 31 (2018) (reporting that
representation of Native American youth arrested, referred for adjudication,
and confined at the federal level during the same period was greater at
thirteen to nineteen percent).
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lands. 175 And in recent years some restrictions have been placed
on the federal government’s ability to unilaterally funnel tribal
youth into the federal system. 176 But inconsistent data collection
continues, allowing tribal youth to remain invisible victims of a
system built for adults. 177
For instance, the Urban Institute built upon its 2011
investigation to further track federal prosecution of youth in
Indian Country, issuing a new report in 2015. 178 That study
found that federal agencies did little since the Institute’s 2011
findings to improve on data collection and reporting to ensure
that all Native youth processed in federal court were properly
counted. 179 Similarly, the 2018 U.S. Department of Justice
Indian Country Investigations and Prosecutions Report fails to
provide specific data on the number of youth arrested,
prosecuted, or transferred within the federal court system. 180
Only passing reference is made to the cases of children, with one
case study involving the “declination” of prosecution of an
alleged sexual assault case where both boys involved—alleged
assailant and victim—were twelve years old. 181 Yet, the report
further notes that closed federal cases in Indian Country had
increased three percent—from 2,210 to 2,281—total. 182
175.
See ADAMS, supra note 170, at viii (asserting that the federal system
is better able to address serious offenders because of the limitations of tribal
courts and detention facilities).
176.
See id. at 2 (describing features of the 2010 Tribal Law and Order
Act).
177.
Addie Rolnick, Untangling the Web: Juvenile Justice in Indian
Country, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & POL’Y 49, 49 (2016).
178.
See WILLIAM ADAMS ET AL., EXAMINING INDIAN COUNTRY CASES IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1 (2015) (“The report builds on an earlier study conducted by
Urban, Tribal Youth in the Federal Justice System . . . which explored issues
surrounding the measurement of American Indian juveniles whose criminal
cases are processed in the federal justice system.”).
179.
See id. at 13 (“Except for EOUSA . . . . the agencies did not report
changes in their data collection or reporting methods for IC cases.”).
180.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INDIAN COUNTRY INVESTIGATIONS
AND PROSECUTIONS (2018) (focusing generally on Indian Country
prosecutions).
181.
Id. at 19.
182. Id. at 2.
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The Trump Administration’s recent announcement of a
task force to focus on missing and murdered Native peoples on
tribal lands—dubbed Operation Lady Justice—provides further
reason for concern. Intended to clear high numbers of cold cases
in Indian Country, the Administration has called for further
arrests, prosecutions, and harsh sentences. 183 It may be that
such action, focused on delivering results, may cause even more
Native youth to be swept into the federal system to be tried as
adults. 184
B. “Gang Related” Matters
Alleged “gang members” face similar concerns of assumed
adultification. 185 That is, by virtue of their purported
affiliations, such children are treated as adults despite what the
Supreme Court has held in decades of juvenile jurisprudence. 186
183.
See generally Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Trump Administration
Launches Presidential Task Force on Missing and Murdered Native
Americans and Alaska Natives (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/trump-administration-launches-presidential-task-force-missing-andmurdered-american-indians (last visited Mar. 29, 2020) (“The task force,
designated Operation Lady Justice, has been empowered to review Indian
Country cold cases, to strengthen law enforcement protocols, and work with
tribes to improve investigations, information sharing and a more seamless
response to missing persons investigations.”) [https://perma.cc/9T4P52K8?type=image].
184.
See Stephanie Ebbs, Trump Administration Launches Task Force on
Missing, Murdered Indigenous Peoples: ‘Operation Lady Justice,’ ABC NEWS
(Jan.
29,
2020,
5:27
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trumpadministration-launches-task-force-missing-murdered-indigenous
/story?id=68617962 (last visited Apr. 1, 2020) (“Annita Lucchesi, executive
director of the Sovereign Bodies Institute, said the task force’s goals are too
vague to make a meaningful difference and that it feels like a matter of
convenience in an election year.”) [https://perma.cc/P6J5-B54V].
185.
See Riane Miller Bolin, Adultification in Juvenile Corrections: A
Comparison of Juvenile and Adult Offenders 2 (Aug. 9, 2014) (unpublished
Ph.D dissertation, University of South Carolina) (on file with University of
South Carolina Scholar Commons) (“These changes largely resulted from the
growing belief that some juveniles, particularly those involved in violent and
serious crimes, deserved to be treated as adults as they were engaging in adult
crimes.”).
186.
See id. (stating that the Supreme Court began the transformation of
the juvenile justice system beginning in the 1960s).
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The continued transfer of juvenile gang members in federal
criminal court is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s
twenty-first century teachings about adolescent development. A
series of cases from the Eastern District of New York provides a
stark example of the problem. 187
In 2018, two boys—aged fifteen and seventeen—and a
seventeen-year-old girl were transferred to be tried as adults in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 188
They were charged with conspiracy and acting in concert with
other alleged members of the MS-13 gang to murder four
youth—rival gang members—whom they helped lure to the
woods. 189 Although it is unclear exactly what violent actions
were taken by the juveniles once the victims arrived to the
woods, there the victims were beaten and stabbed to death by a
large group the MS-13—otherwise known as the La Mara
Salvatrucha gang. 190
Applying the federal juvenile transfer statute, the district
court was required to consider “the age and social background
of the juvenile, the nature of the alleged offense, the extent and
nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record, the juvenile’s
present intellectual development and psychological maturity,
the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response

187.
United States v. Juvenile Male (Juvenile Male I), 327 F. Supp. 3d 573
(E.D.N.Y. 2018); United States v. Juvenile Male (Juvenile Male II), 316 F.
Supp. 3d 553 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); United States. v. Juvenile Female (Juvenile
Female), 313 F. Supp. 3d 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
188.
See Juvenile Male I, 327 F.Supp. 3d. at 577 (“[A]fter carefully
analyzing the required statutory factors, the Court concludes in its discretion
that,
notwithstanding
the
statutory
presumption
in
favor
of juvenile adjudication, the government in this case has rebutted that
presumption and met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant’s transfer to adult status is warranted.”); see also Juvenile
Female, 313 F. Supp. at 416 (same); Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 556
(same).
189.
See Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (describing the conspiracy
and acting in concert allegations); see also Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp. 3d at
416 (same); Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (same).
190.
See Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 577 (describing how a group
acted together to take the victims’ lives); see also Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp.
3d at 416 (same); Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (same).
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to such efforts, and the availability of programs designed to
treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems.” 191
In the end, in all cases “the Court conclude[d] in its
discretion that, notwithstanding the statutory presumption in
favor of juvenile adjudication, the government has rebutted that
presumption and met its burden by proving by a preponderance
of evidence that the defendant’s transfer to adult status is
warranted.” 192 While the crimes alleged resulted in the tragic
loss of life, the group-think that was clearly at play suggests the
teachings of Roper, Graham, and Miller were not sufficiently
considered. 193
The court explicitly gave much greater weight to
membership in a gang and the nature of the offense than any
other determinative statutory factor. 194 But the Roper, Graham,
Miller trilogy recognizes that youth are more easily swayed by
peers than adults. 195 Furthermore, the district court explained
the nature of the alleged offense when “‘a crime was particularly
serious’” or “when the case involves ‘[t]he heinous nature of the
crime of intentional murder’” supported transfer. 196 But, again,
this does not account for the more nuanced approach offered by
the U.S. Supreme Court in its most recent Eighth Amendment
191.
See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2018) (providing federal law factors to be
considered in assessing whether a juvenile transfer is appropriate).
192.
Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 577; Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp.
3d at 416; Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 556.
193.
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472, 479 (2012) (noting that
making youth irrelevant to imposition of the harshest prison sentence poses
too great a risk of disproportionate punishment) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
194.
See Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 588 (finding that seriousness
of the alleged offenses and MS-13 involvement weighed strongly in favor of
transfer over other factors); Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (same);
Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 565 (same).
195.
See Mae C. Quinn, Constitutionally Incapable: Parole Boards as
Sentencing Courts, 72 SMU L. REV. 565, 571 (2019) [hereinafter Quinn,
Constitutionally Incapable] (noting that the Court acknowledged in Roper,
Graham, and Miller that youth are “more susceptible to negative influences
and pressures”).
196.
Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 581; Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp.
3d at 421; Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 560 (quoting United States v.
Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 590 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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jurisprudence that recognizes youth are categorically less
culpable—even in murder cases. 197 In each of these
acting-in-concert cases, the district court allowed the alleged
crime to be nearly determinative of transfer, without also
highlighting that “Roper and Graham emphasized that the
distinctive attributes of youth diminish penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” 198
As the Court stated in Miller, “‘just as the chronological age
of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight,
so must the background and mental and emotional development
of a youthful defendant be duly considered’ in assessing his
culpability.” 199 But that did not happen either. 200 Rather, it
seems the realities of the juveniles’ social backgrounds,
intellectual development, and psychological maturity were used
against them.
For instance, Juvenile Male II was left by his parents at a
young age in El Salvador, grew up in poverty, saw his uncle
murdered by a gang, and was smuggled to the United States. 201
Yet rather than treat this as youth-related mitigation, the
district court declared the child’s “social background, taken in
its entirety, suggests a low likelihood of rehabilitation within
the short period of time before his release if convicted as a
juvenile.” 202
As for Juvenile Male I, his doctor opined on apparent
“immaturity and executive function issues;” however, the court
concluded that this opinion was “of limited significance in the

197.
See generally Quinn, Constitutionally Incapable, supra note 195
(outlining ways in which even homicide matters need to be approached with
the presumption that youth are amenable to rehabilitation and change).
198.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
199.
Id. at 476 (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116).
200.
See, e.g., Juvenile Female, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 422 (stating that the
older that a juvenile defendant is, the harder it becomes to reform his or her
values and behavior).
201. See Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 561–62 (noting the difficulties
the juvenile faced in moving to the United States from El Salvador).
202.
Id. at 563.
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context of this [transfer] motion.” 203 This was because the court
did not have confidence in the doctor’s ability “to conclude
whether the defendant’s behavior reflects immaturity or simply
a lack of remorse.” 204 But a lack of confidence in determining
whether a juvenile is able to be rehabilitated should weigh in
favor of retaining juvenile jurisdiction, not waiving it, even for
immigrant youth. 205
Indeed, the court failed to determine whether each of the
juveniles who had been lured into gang life was “irreparably
corrupt.” 206 As the Montgomery Court explained, Miller
“rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty
for . . . juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the transient
immaturity of youth,” therefore drawing a distinction “between
children whose crimes reflect transient immaturity and those
rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” 207
C. Immigrant Youth
Immigrant youth may find themselves facing federal
criminal charges for far less than gang-related violent activity.
Indeed, under the current federal Administration, this
possibility seems more likely than ever before. Its practice of
expedited processing for the supposed crime of improper entry
and reentry may be resulting in further immigrant youth being
swept up in federal court prosecutions that leave them with
adult convictions. 208
203.

Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
Id.
205.
See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (noting that
occasions for sentencing juveniles to the harshest possible sentences will be
uncommon).
206.
See generally Juvenile Male I, 327 F. Supp. 3d 573 (failing to discuss
whether juvenile met the “irreparably corrupt” standard as set forth in
Montgomery); Juvenile Male II, 316 F. Supp. 3d 553 (same); Juvenile Female,
313 F. Supp. 3d 412 (same).
207.
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
208.
See Prosecuting People for Coming to the United States, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org
/research/immigration-prosecutions (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (explaining
that high conviction rates for these federal offenses lead to many migrants
204.

560

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 523 (2020)

Under
the
banner
of
“Operation
Streamline,”
immigration-related prosecutions have been fast-tracked in
many border locations, such that defendants often meet with
their attorney the same day they resolve their case. 209 The
number of prosecutions for such matters have risen from
approximately 15,000 in 2004 to over 80,000 in 2019. 210 The
sheer volume of cases being moved en masse strongly suggests
that, beyond presenting due process violations, some significant
percentage of these matters may involve juveniles under the age
of eighteen who are being processed as adults. 211
Indeed, not only are such matters being moved like an
assembly line—sometimes with seventy to ninety defendants
pleading guilty in one day—many of these illegal entry matters
involve individuals who may have valid asylum claims. 212
Human Rights First researchers have documented hundreds of
instances of such summary proceedings and confirmed with
federal defenders that many of their clients appear to have valid
asylum claims. 213 As described in one recent article, “[i]n

being subject to incarceration in federal prison for months or longer) [https://
perma.cc/MDK9-7E4N].
209.
See id. (describing the ways in which this rushed setting can impede
an attorney’s ability to provide quality representation).
210.
Id.
211.
See Curt Prendergast, New Guidelines Cut Sentences for Illegal
Border Crossings, TUSCON.COM (Jan. 21, 2017), https://tucson.com/news/local
/border/new-guidelines-cut-sentences-for-illegal-border-crossing/article
_1b2685d2-9539-5fa2-a624-f1eba9e54b75.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2020)
(providing sentencing statistics for a range of border re-entry cases where age
of the defendant was unknown to the Federal Sentencing Commission)
[https://perma.cc/HHD8-DWJ7?type=image].
212.
See Eleanor Acer, Criminal Prosecutions and Illegal Entry: A Deeper
Dive, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64963
/criminal-prosecutions-and-illegal-entry-a-deeper-dive/ (last visited Mar. 8,
2020) (describing how in the first year after President Trump signed an
executive order to make criminal prosecutions of immigration offenses a high
priority, prosecutions rose and more asylum seekers were targeted) [https://
perma.cc/4S7E-F5QV].
213.
See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 12 (2018), https://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-PunishingRefugees-Migrants.pdf (stating that in some cases attorneys advise their
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violation of Article 31, DHS continues to refer asylum seekers
for criminal prosecutions, while federal prosecutors routinely
fail to drop charges or stay prosecutions involving asylum
seekers, and federal judges and magistrates proceed with
convictions.” 214
Similarly, even when immigrant youth under the age of
eighteen are placed with the Office of Refugee Resettlement
rather than criminally prosecuted upon detection at the
border—that does not mean they will remain. 215 Under the
Trump Administration’s policies, many such youth are merely
being held until age eighteen and then turned over to the
Department of Human Services and Homeland Security to be
dealt with as adults. 216 It is clear many such youth are then
deported. What is not as clear—but may be happening—is that
such youth are pleading guilty as adults to the federal crime of
illegal entry before their removal.
Even beyond border towns, immigrant youth are
overrepresented in federal matters. 217 Reports suggest

clients that raising asylum concerns will only be futile) [https://perma.cc/8P63BBVB].
214.
Acer, supra note 212.
215.
See Alexandra Schwartz, The Office of Refugee Resettlement is
Completely Unprepared for the Thousands of Immigrant Children Now in Its
Care, THE NEW YORKER (July 21, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news
/news-desk/the-office-of-refugee-resettlement-is-completely-unprepared-forthe-thousands-of-immigrant-children-now-in-its-care (last visited Mar. 8,
2020) (“One terrible irony of the current crisis is that a government office
whose explicit goal is to reunify children with their families is now being used
to hold children who have entered its jurisdiction because the government has
forcibly removed them from their parents’ care.”) [https://perma.cc/2V7JC95B?type=image].
216.
See Emily Stewart, Immigrant Children Can Be Detained, Prosecuted
and Deported, Once They Turn 18, VOX (June 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com
/2018/6/21/17489320/unaccompanied-minors-ice-detention-family-separation18 (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (“Under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2013, unaccompanied immigrant children in ORR
custody after turning 18 are supposed to be placed in the ‘least restrictive
setting available’ after taking into account whether they oppose a danger to
themselves or others or might try to flee.”) [https://perma.cc/9KN8-55EL].
217.
See Wendy Sawyer, Youth Confinement: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports
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immigration officials are working in connection with local
authorities to target non-citizens in an effort to deport them
based upon relatively minor matters that are viewed as serious
claims of wrongdoing in immigration court. 218 On the flip side,
some local prosecutors have also begun referring matters to
federal courts where they know youthful defendants are more
likely to be tried as adults following federal transfer—and then
potentially deported. 219
Thus local prosecutors are declaring federal adult
prosecution as their new “crime fighting strategy.” 220 In one
such recent matter, Nathaniel Valenzuela, a tiny teen accused
of selling fentanyl and possessing a weapon was being held in
custody as prosecutors sought to have him tried as an adult in
federal court. 221 Tragically, Nathaniel—who in fact was a
life-long resident of Albuquerque—never saw his day in court. 222
Instead, the small boy took his own life to avoid serving time in
federal prison with adults. 223

/youth2019.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (detailing the racial disparities in
juvenile facilities) [https://perma.cc/5J55-HTA2].
218.
See Shamira Ibrahim, Black Immigrants and the Prison to
Deportation Pipeline, VOX (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/identities
/2019/9/30/20875821/black-immigrants-school-prison-deportation-pipeline
(last updated Feb. 5, 2020) (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (reporting that low-level
crimes such as marijuana possession are lumped into the offense of “drug
trafficking” in immigration court—even if it is a misdemeanor in criminal
courts—mandating automatic deportation without any discretion for a judge
to consider individual circumstances) [https://perma.cc/5R5S-NEM2].
219.
See Elise Kaplan, Referring Cases to Federal Court a Crime Fighting
Strategy, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 13, 2019, 6:15 PM), https://
www.abqjournal.com/1391298/referring-cases-to-federal-court-a-crimefighting-strategy.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (“But referring cases to
federal court is a strategy District Attorney Raúl Torrez has cited recently as
a way to seek the detention of defendants pending trial, as well as longer
sentences if they are convicted.”) [https://perma.cc/44T6-QJ77].
220.
See id. (providing examples of teenagers who did not meet the criteria
to be tried as an adult locally but could nonetheless be if a federal judge
decided to do so).
221.
See id. (recounting that according to Nathaniel’s attorney, a charge
involving sixty fentanyl pills is not one normally prosecuted in federal court).
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
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V. Conclusion
Little known by the general public, our federal court system
is being used to prosecute and punish children in this country
as if they are adults. Sadly, the exact extent of the problem is
unknown—in large part because of the lack of accurate data
about such cases. But it is no small problem. The numbers that
we know about are significant. More than this, the practices
used to transfer youth in federal court fail to sufficiently account
for constitutional requirements established by the U.S.
Supreme Court over several decades.
Youth are both being denied protections established by the
Court in the 1970s for kids facing transfer and being adultified
in ways that violate the letter and spirit of the Court’s holdings
that demonstrate that youth are categorically less culpable than
their adult counterparts. Federal transfer is also used in ways
that tend to overrepresent and further traumatize already
marginalized youth—including tribal teens, immigrant youth,
and those seeking connection through gang affiliation.
Federal prosecutors need to rethink their practices relating
to child defendants, redirecting more such youth to juvenile
courts and local venues where they can receive age-appropriate
interventions and community-based supports. Courts should
reject requests to try children as full-grown adults in federal
courthouses. And, ultimately, federal statutes need to be revised
to take account of modern understandings of the adolescent
mind—and no longer allow for Article III adultification or
erasure of childhood as a matter of law.

